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There is evidence in American markets that s preads reflect illiquidity and information 
asymmetry costs. This paper investigates the nature of bid-ask spreads at the BOVESPA, Brazil, 
where brokers trade directly. We compare these results with other markets in which there are 
market specialists, and find the same relationship between spreads, stock prices and liquidity 
measures. We use bid ask spread as a proxy for liquidity and we find evidence of  liquidity 
premium in the Brazilian stock market.  
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The financial literature relates bid-ask spreads with liquidity and information asymmetry. The 
larger the i nformation asymmetry and the lower a stock’s liquidity, the higher is the bid-ask 
spread. There is also evidence that stock returns are negatively related to bid-ask spreads, and the 
usual interpretation is that there is an illiquidity premium. 
Most of the time, the objects of study are American markets, where there are market specialists 
or market makers. Market specialists and market makers work as dealers, buying for and selling 
from their own inventory. In the case of a specialist market, such as the New York Stock 
Exchange, each dealer specializes in certain stocks. In many stock exchanges, they have the 
crucial role of providing liquidity to buyers and sellers, and their gains correspond to the bid-ask 
spread, that is, the difference between the ask-price at which the specialist is willing to sell to a 
buyer and the bid-price at which the specialist is willing to buy from the seller. Such stock 
exchanges require that specialists keep a fair and organized market, buying and selling whenever 
there is a temporary mismatch between the supply and demand for a certain stock. The bid-ask 
spread can be interpreted as a cost the investor incurs to execute a buy or sell order immediately 
by transacting with the market specialist. 
At the BOVESPA, stockbrokers transact directly, either through the electronic system or the 
open outcry system on the exchange floor, disclosing their clients’ buy or sell orders.  Whenever 
there is a convergence between the buy and the sell order, a deal is closed, the transaction price is 
announced and the order is withdrawn from the system. The bid-ask spread corresponds to the 
difference between the best buy offer (the buy offer with the highest quote) and the best sell offer 
(the sell offer with the lowest quote) at a certain moment. This paper explains how the bid-ask 
spread in Brazil is formed and investigates whether the same associations between spread and 
liquidity measures found in American markets occur in Brazil. In a sense, this study is 
unprecedented, for we have not found any other paper that has investigated bid-ask spreads at the 
BOVESPA. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section II contains a review of the literature 
concerning the theory and the evidence on bid-ask spreads in American markets and a discussion 




an intra-day example. In Section IV, we describe the methodology and the findings from 
investigating the relationship between spreads and liquidity measures and the medhodology for 
testing the existence of liquidity premium in the Brazilian market. Section V concludes the 
paper. 
 
II.  Review of literature 
 
The literature relates bid-ask spreads with dealer inventory cost and information asymmetry 
costs. 
Demsetz (1968) wrote a seminal article about the relationship between bid-ask spreads and 
volume of trading at the NYSE. He interpreted the bid-ask spread as resulting from an 
immediacy problem in supply and demand analysis. One can understand the spread as the 
markup for immediate exchange in organized markets, and as the wholesaler or retailer markup 
in non-organized markets. Market specialists may act as brokers or as dealers in the NYSE. 
Whenever a trader decides to move to other positions on the exchange floor, he may leave her 
order with the specialist. In this role, the specialist matches buy and sell orders and shares the 
commission charged to the customer. The specialist may also step in to match the order left with 
her by trading for her own account, acting as a trader. In this dealer role, she does not share any 
commissions, but can engage in an opposite trading action at a price differential later. She buys 
for her own account hoping to resell at a higher price, and sells for her own account hoping to 
repurchase later at a lower price. Thus, the specialist builds her own inventory and earns her 
income from the bid-ask spread. An investor willing to sell a stock at a certain price most 
probably will not find a buyer instantaneously. This sell order may take minutes, hours or even 
days to be filled. The existence of market specialists offers this investor the possibility of selling 
the stock immediately. 
The narrower the difference between the lower sell offer and the higher buy offer, the shorter i s 
the time required to trade, and consequently, the lower is the waiting time. The higher the 
competition for the stock, the shorter will be the waiting time and the narrower will be the bid-
ask spread. There are several types of competition, according to  Demsetz: rivalry for the 
specialist’s job, competing markets, outsiders who submit limit orders rather than market orders, 
floor traders who may bypass the specialists by crossing buy and sell orders themselves, and 
other specialists. Demsetz tested the relationship between spread and transaction rate. He used 
two variables to measure the transaction rate: (1) the number of transactions per day, based on 
data for two days of trading, and (2) the number of holders of a given stock. He has also 
investigated other competition intensity measures, such as the number of markets in which the 
security is listed, the number of shareholders, and whether dollar spreads vary proportionally 
with stock share price. He found strong evidence that dollar spreads increase with price, and that 
they decline with an increase in the transaction rate. 
Copeland and Galai (1983) developed a theoretical model to explain the relationship between 
bid-ask spreads and information asymmetry. They assume that dealers face two different types of 
traders: informed traders and liquidity-motivated traders. Informed traders have access to inside 
information and have better estimates of the future security price than dealers. Because informed 
traders have the option of not trading with specialists, specialists will never gain, but only lose in 
these transactions. On the other hand, the liquidity-motivated traders will pay a premium for 
immediacy, and the specialists will always gain in these transactions.  Specialists choose a bid-




with liquidity-motivated traders. If the spread is too wide, specialists lose expected revenues with 
liquidity traders, but minimize losses with informed traders. If spreads are too narrow, the 
probability of loss in trades with informed traders tends to increase but is offset by the potential 
gains in trades with liquidity-motivated traders. The bid-ask spread is considered as a free 
straddle option. The dealer gives to a prospective buy trader a call option to buy at the exercise 
price X A > P0, where P0 is the dealer’s opinion of the intrinsic value of the stock share at time 
zero, and gives a prospective sell trader a put option at the exercise price XB < P0. Both options 
are issued out of the money. Liquidity-motivated traders will be willing to suffer a certain loss by 
exercising the out-of-the-money option. This is the cost of immediacy. The informed trader will 
exercise the option only when it is in the money, that is, when she believes that V0 > XA, or V0 < 
XB, where V0 is the intrinsic value perceived by the informed trader, and it is different from P0, 
the intrinsic value perceived by the other participants. Bid-ask spreads will be wider as security 
price volatility increases, as the security price rises, and as trading volume decreases. Spreads 
will be narrower as the availability of public information about the security increases. Therefore, 
spreads reflect information asymmetry about the security. The greater the information 
asymmetry, the wider the bid-ask spread. 
Stoll (1989) decomposes bid-ask spreads in three types of costs faced by a dealer: order 
processing, inventory, and adverse information costs. He also differentiates between quoted 
spread and realized spread. “Quoted spread is the difference between the ask price quoted by a 
dealer and the bid price quoted by a dealer at a point in time. The realized spread is the average 
difference between the price at which a dealer sells at one point in time and the price at which a 
dealer buys at an earlier point in time” – pp115.  Inventory cost and adverse information cost 
models imply that the realized spread earned by a dealer is smaller than the quoted spread. 
According to Stoll, if the spread reflects only order processing costs, ask and bid prices always 
straddle the “true” price. Suppose a transaction occurs at the bid price B0. The dealer covers costs 
by buying at B0 and selling at the ask price A1. Roll (1984) found evidence that the covariance of 
transaction returns is an estimate of the realized spread in an efficient market. The sequences of 
purchases at the bid price are ultimately offset by sequences of sales at the ask price, and the 
realized spread should equal the quoted spread. 
 
In the inventory-holding-cost model, when a dealer purchases a security, he lowers bid and ask 
quotes to induce dealer sales and inhibit additional dealer purchases. When a dealer sells a 
security, he raises bid and ask quotes in order to induce dealer purchases and inhibit dealer sales. 
Therefore, in order to induce public transactions to even out inventory positions, dealers tend to 
change the position of the spread relative to the “true price”. 
According to the information-asymmetry-cost model, as in the Copeland and Galai model, when 
a purchase occurs at the bid price B0, bid and ask prices are lowered because the transaction 
conveys information that the “true price” is lower. Under the inventory-cost and information-
asymmetry-cost models, realized spreads are always smaller than quoted spreads. 
Huang and Stoll (1997) try to construct and estimate a basic trade indicator model of spread 
components and to provide a method for identifying the spread’s three components. It is difficult 
to distinguish between inventory cost and adverse information cost, because quotes react to 
trades in the same manner. 
They construct a basic trade indicator model and conclude that the sum of adverse information 




proportions of the spread, but these proportions increase dramatically when the indicator model 
is modified to account for medium and large trades. 
They extend the basic model in two ways: (1) to consider the fact that inventory effects induce 
negative serial correlations in orders and in quotes, in addition to serial correlations from the bid-
ask bounce of prices, and (2) in a cross-section approach, using information on trading pressures 
in other stocks to infer the inventory component of the spread in a particular stock. The basis for 
this second approach is that quotes are adjusted in stock A in response to trades in other stocks in 
order to hedge inventory risk, but trades in other stocks convey little information about stock A. 
The second approach helps to distinguish between inventory and information asymmetry costs. 
However, in the Brazilian market, brokers trade directly. They disclose market orders and limit 
orders in the electronic system or on the exchange floor. All quotes are registered in the 
BOVESPA system. Bid and ask quotes are withdrawn from the system whenever there is a 
transaction or the broker withdraws the quote on customer demand. Bloomberg has built an 
intra-day database with the BOVESPA records. The quoted spread corresponds to the difference 
between the highest bid offer and the lowest ask offer at a certain moment. 
Quoted spreads in Brazil should not reflect order processing or inventory costs, since there are no 
specialists in the role of dealers. However, quoted spreads do reflect information asymmetry 
costs, not exactly as in the Copeland and Galai model, because there is no market specialist. 
When the trading intensity of a given security increases, more information is conveyed to the 
market about the security, and the discrepancy between the “true value” seen by potential buyers 
and potential sellers should decrease. Bid offers and ask offers should converge. If bid-ask 
spreads reflect information asymmetry costs, one expects to find a negative relation between 
spreads and measures of trade intensity. 
According to Merton (1987), the information asymmetry about a certain security is related to the 
number of investors willing to transact that security. He constructs a market equilibrium theory 
in the presence of incomplete information, assuming that investors are very well informed about 
only a set of available securities, and the sets are distinct for different investors. When investors 
build their optimal portfolios, they consider only the securities on which they are well informed. 
The number of investors that hold the security reflects the availability of information about it. 
There is a liquidity premium or information asymmetry premium that is not considered in the 
traditional CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model). 
If the number of investors willing to transact a certain security increases, the volume of analysis 
of this security also increases, and the rate at which the information is incorporated in the price 
also rises. Information asymmetry is also negatively related to security liquidity. If the number of 
investors willing to transact a certain security increases, the security’s liquidity also increases, 
and the probability of buying or selling the security at the fair price also rises. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1989) found strong evidence to the effect that American stock returns 
are positively related to bid-ask spreads, controlling for company size, January effect and 
sensibility to a market index, analyzing CRSP database. They allocated stocks to forty-nine 
equally weighted portfolios, first according to bid-ask spread and second according to beta. They 
organized the data in a pool of cross-sections and time series and ran an OLS regression. The 
dependent variable was the excess return for each of the 49 portfolios, and the independent 
variables were beta relative to a market index excess return, the specific return, the size of the 
portfolio measured by the total market value of the portfolio equity, bid-ask spreads and dummy 
variables controlling for the January effect. They found evidence that the stocks` excess returns 




Eleswarapu (1997) studied whether excess returns of stocks traded at the NASDAQ are 
positively correlated to bid-ask spreads. He allocated stocks to 49 portfolios ranked first by bid-
ask spread and second by beta. He ran Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions and SUR (seemingly 
unrelated regressions). He found a significant and positive relationship between stock excess 
returns and bid-ask spreads.  The Amihud and Mendelson and Eleswarapu findings are usually 
interpreted as evidence of the existence of a liquidity premium in the American market. 
This paper analyses the relationship between bid-ask spreads and transaction rate measures.  A 
negative relationship between spread and transaction rate measures could be interpreted as the 
spread reflecting information asymmetry costs. 
 
III. Bid-ask spread database 
 
We use the daily bid-ask spreads disclosed by Bloomberg. The daily series is built from intra-day 
series. As this is a first project using the Bloomberg database, a description of how daily spread 
series are built from intra-day data is certainly warranted. 
Table 1 presents an illustrative sequence of bid, ask and trade records for Telemar Preferred, the 
most heavily traded stock at the Bovespa. Since no specialist exists, the broker is not required to 
quote a full spread, and this can be made up of a bid quote from one broker and an ask quote 
from another, provided they are the best quotes at that moment. 
A section of the records presented in Table 1 can be chronologically examined as follows. The 
first record, containing a quote from brokerage firm number 82, exhibits a sell quote at 39.5 for 
10 lots of 1,000 shares each. The immediately subsequent record, number 2, is for the best buy 
and sell quotes at 18:02:46, made up of a buy offer for 400 lots at 39.27 and a sell order for 200 
lots at 39.45, both for 1,000-share lots, that is, the round lot size for Telemar preferred. It may be 
seen that the quote in the first record in Table 1 has not affected the observed spread. Since Table 
1 contains only a subset of all intra-day records, the table does not provide information on how 
old the quotes reflected in record number 2 are, and neither are the originating brokers’ numbers. 
We do know that, at the time of record number 2, those quotes were still valid and were the best 
available. 
Record number 3 indicates a change in the best quotes, since the Best Bid quote is now at 39.2, 
for a volume of 5 million shares (5000 round lots). This buy quote is older than record number 1. 
The fact that this replaces the bid at 39.27 indicates that the bid at 39.27 has been removed by the 
originating broker. In a similar fashion, record number 4 displays a bid offer from broker number 
39 that supersedes the current best bid. This new quote appears in record number 5. The other 
records follow the same logic, i.e., they may be new records changing the best existing quote or 
not, may represent changes in the best quote, may confirm it, and may correspond to an actual 
trade, which is represented by type = T. The last pair of best quotes appears in record number 20, 
and these are the prices used in the computation of daily spreads in this paper, because they 
correspond to the last best buy and sell quotes for the day (October 8, 2004, in this case). 
 
 
IV. Methodology and results 
 





Daily bid-ask spread series were collected, for Brazilian stocks, in the Bloomberg database. 
Bloomberg provides daily spread information from January 1995 on, but only from January 1998 
are there data for a sufficiently large number of securities (approximately 300 stocks). Thus, the 
series were collected for the January 1998 to December 2003 period. The daily bid-ask spread 
corresponds to the difference between the last best (lowest) sell quote and the last best (highest) 
buy quote. 
Demsetz (1968) found a positive association between bid-ask spread and stock price. We 
examined whether such an association also exists at the BOVESPA. This involved constructing 
series of averages between the last best buy quote and the last best sell offer for all the stocks in 
the sample and computing the correlation between those series, representing security price levels, 
and daily bid-ask spread series. During the period analyzed, we could estimate correlations of 
473 stocks, 47,99% of the stocks were traded in more than 1000 days, and 94,29% were traded in 
more than 500 days.  The average correlation coefficient is equal to 0.17. Figure 1 contains the 
frequency distribution of computed correlations. For each stock, we tested whether the 














t = Student t statistic with n – 2 degrees of freedom; 
n = number of observations; 
rxy = computed correlation coefficient between variables X and Y. 
 
We found 271 stocks (61% of the overall sample) for which the correlation is positive and 
significant, and 97 stocks (21.75%) with negative and significant correlations, meaning that the 
association found by Demsetz is true for the majority of cases. 
Following the methodology employed by Amihud and Mendelson (1989), and Eleswarapu 
(1997), spreads were computed on a relative basis, that is, the spread in Brazilian Reais was 
divided by the simple average between the last best buy and the last best sell quote. The series of 
relative monthly spreads were constructed from the relative daily spread series. 
The Bloomberg data series contain a few negative spreads and some zero spreads. These cases 
were treated as outliers and removed from the sample. In order to reduce the influence of other, 
undetected outliers, the spread for month t and the i-th security was set equal to the median of the 
daily spreads observed during month t. The papers by Amihud and Mendelson (1989) and 
Eleswarapu (1997) used the means of daily spreads. 
Next, data for monthly turnover, volume and number of trades were collected from the 
Economatica database, covering the January 1998 to December 2003 period. Table 2 provides 
the correlations for the series of turnover, volume, and number of trades. It is apparent that all 
correlations are very high. 
 
So as to prevent collinearity problems, we opted for running simple OLS regression models, with 
spread as the dependent variable, against each of the measures of transaction activity as the 
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Si,t = monthly relative bid-ask for stock i in month t; 
Ti,t = turnover for stock i in month t;           
Vi,t = volume traded of stock i during month t; 
Ni,t = number of trades of stock i in month t; 
a, b = coefficients to be estimated in each equation. 
 
Table 3 contains the regression results. There is strong evidence for a negative correlation 
between bid-ask spreads and all traditional measures of transaction activity in the Brazilian 
market, as expected when the spreads are interpreted as an additional measure of liquidity. 
 
In an attempt to confirm that bid-ask spreads are strongly and negatively associated with the 
usual liquidity measures, we also estimated the following regression model: 
 




  RES(Ti,t, Vi,t) = residuals from the regression ln(Ti,t) = g0 + g1ln(Vi,t) + ei,t  
  RES(Ti,t, Ni,t) = residuals from the regression ln(Ti,t) = g0 + g1ln(Ni,t) + ei,t 
 
Our previous results were confirmed, as indicated by the results in Table 4. It is apparent that, in 
addition to the influence of turnover, there is significant incremental information in the number 
of trades, but not in volume data. 
 
In order to validate those results, seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) were estimated using 
the data in a pooled time series-cross section structure. This adjusts for the possible correlations 
among error terms. This required the monthly ranking of stocks by bid-ask spread, followed by 
their classification into 10 portfolios. Portfolio P1 included the stocks with smallest spreads, and 
P10 contained the stocks with largest spreads. The number of stocks in each portfolio and the 
portfolio composition vary from month to month. In  the 72-month period, each portfolio was 
comprised of 37 stocks, on average, and any portfolio contained a minimum of 29 and a 
maximum of 42 stocks. All stocks were equally weighted in every portfolio. 
Table 5 provides the means, for the 72 months, of spreads, returns, turnover, number of trades, 
volume traded and time during which stocks remained in the portfolios. Turnover, number of 
trades, and volume data vary inversely with portfolio rank, as was detected in the pooled time 
series-cross section tests. As far down as P3, there seems to be an association between returns 
and portfolio rank, but this disappears for higher-ranked portfolios. The mean turnover in 




2 and 3 are responsible for 95% of total mean turnover. If we describe the market as being 
formed of first-tier stocks (“blue chips”), second-tier and third-tier stocks, it might be said that 
“blue chips” are the stocks in portfolio P1, second-tier stocks are in portfolios P2 and P3, and the 
remaining portfolios contain stocks in the third and lowest tier. It may be noticed, in addition, 
that P10 exhibits a mean bid-ask spread above 100%. When one analyzes intra-day series of 
spreads for very thinly traded stocks, some irregular behavior can explain such a number. 
 
Table 6 provides the analysis of one-month migrations of stocks from one portfolio to another. 
This was constructed as follows. For each month t, a list of stocks contained in portfolio Pn is 
prepared. At month t + 1, we identify to which portfolio those stocks have migrated. The rate of 
migration at month t, from portfolio Pn to portfolio Pm is the ratio of the number of stocks that 
migrated from P n to Pm to the total number of stocks in portfolio Pn at month t. The rates of 
migration indicated in the migration matrix correspond to the means of migration rates of all 
months, from P n to P m. Of course, the total for every row should be equal to 100%. An 
examination of the main diagonal indicates that the highest probability of migration is that from 
Pn to Pn in the span of one month, that is, of remaining in the original portfolio. However, this 
rate is higher for portfolios P1 and P10, indicating greater stability in the groups of more heavily 
and more thinly traded stocks. The migration rates are higher in the intermediary portfolios. 
 
IV.2 Bid-ask spreads and information asymmetry 
 
Provided it is true that bid-ask spreads reflect the degree of information asymmetry, the stocks of 
companies more w idely covered by the media, disclose more information and are more 
intensively analyzed should display lower spreads than stocks for which there is less news 
coverage. 
In order to account for this effect, we measured the proportion of each of the 10 portfolios in 
terms of stocks involved in American Depositary Receipt (ADR) programs, at levels I, II or III. 
The companies involved are supposed to comply with the accounting rules laid down by the SEC 
and the NYSE, forcing them greater disclosure than companies which trade solely in Brazil, 
where they are subject only to the CVM rules. We tested whether the mean ADR proportion 










t = Student’s t-statistic; 
d = average of relative spread differences between portfolios Pn-1 and Pn in the 72-month 
period; 
sd = standard deviation of the differences between relative spreads for portfolios Pn-1 and 
Pn; 
n = number of observations for each portfolio, equal to the number of months (72). 
 
Table 7 contains the average proportions of companies in ADR programs for each portfolio, for 




that the differences decline with portfolio rank, and that all differences are positive and 
significant, with the exception of the difference between portfolios P7 and P8. Hence, we are lead 
to infer that there is evidence pointing to a negative association between portfolio rank by bid-
ask spread and the proportion of ADR programs, a sign that there is a negative association 
between bid-ask spread and the degree of information disclosure. 
 
IV.3 Bid-ask spreads and illiquidity premium 
 
In order to test for the existence of association between returns and bid-ask spreads, series of 
excess monthly returns were constructed for all individual stocks in the sample, using the 
monthly closing prices adjusted for dividends and splits available in the Economática database. 
These returns were computed as described below: 
   




Rit = excess return for stock i in month t. 
Pit = closing price for stock i in month t. 
Rf,t = rate of return of a risk-free asset proxy; this was measured as the monthly return on 
savings certificates. 
 
We decided to analyze the effect of bid-ask spreads on blue chip and second tier stocks 
separately from their effect on third tier stocks. The reason is that the third tier stocks, (according 
to our classification, stocks in portfolios P4 to P10) account for less than 5% of trading turnover, 
meaning that these stocks are quite often shun by investors. Most investors concentrate in the 
stocks included in P1, P2 and P3. Therefore, we included a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
stock is included in portfolios P1, P2 or P3, and 0 otherwise. 
Initially, the tests were performed for individual stocks by OLS regression using pooled time 
series-cross section data: 
 




Ri,t = excess return for stock i in month t. 
a = a constant term. 
b1,i = coefficient for the sensitivity of stock i’s excess return to the excess return on the 
market, estimated in the regression for each individual stock. 
Rm,t = excess return on the market portfolio, proxied by the BOVESPA index. 
b2 = coefficient for the bid-ask spread variable for the stocks included in portfolios P1, 
P2, and P3 (blue chips and second tier stocks). 
b3 = coefficient for the bid-ask spread variable for the stocks included in portfolios P4 to 
P10 (third tier stocks). 
di,t = dummy variable equal to 1 if the stock belongs to P1, P2 or P3, and 0 otherwise. 




ei,t  = error term for stock i in month t. 
 
The coefficients were first estimated for each stock by ignoring the existence of correlation 
among residuals. We used lagged bid-ask spreads to avoid problems of endogeneity between 
returns and spreads. 
As a means of validating the results, seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) were then estimated 
with data for the 10 portfolios ranked by monthly bid-ask spread. All coefficients were estimated 
with an adjustment for correlation among residuals. 
The results of the OLS and SUR approaches are in Table 8. The coefficient measuring the 
sensitivity to the market risk premium is not displayed. In the OLS regressions, 81.15% of the 
b1,i estimated were significant at the 5% level, and in the seemingly unrelated regressions all of 
the b1,i are significant at the 5% level. A positive and significant relationship between returns and 
bid-ask spreads for portfolios P1, P2 and P3 can be observed, but this relationship is not 
significant for the other portfolios. 
This result can be interpreted as evidence for the existence of an i lliquidity or information 
asymmetry premium for the blue chips and second tier stocks, and this is in accordance with the 
results found for the American market. It becomes more natural to discover, that no illiquidity 
premium is found for third tier stocks, since they tend to be ignored by investors. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
Even though the Brazilian market structure does not contain specialists or market makers 
operating as dealers, it has been verified that bid-ask spreads are negatively related to 
conventional liquidity measures. We can interpret that bid-ask spread is related to information 
asymmetry as it is in the American market. The less liquid a stock is, the higher the information 
asymmetry and the higher is the stock’s bid-ask spread. This seems to be an  interesting result, 
indicating that the price for information asymmetry appears to be independent of the market 
structure. Evidence of its existence has been found both in markets where dealers operate for 
their own account and in markets where brokers transact directly with each other. We confirmed 
this result by observing a negative association between the proportions of companies involved in 
ADR programs, in each portfolio ranked by bid-ask spread, and the average bid-ask spreads for 
the ranked portfolios. This result is consistent with the expectation that a higher degree of 
disclosure is associated with lower transactions costs incurred by investors. 
We have also found evidence of a positive relationship between returns and bid-ask spread for 
blue chips and second tier stocks. The results are similar to those obtained for the American 
markets, and can be interpreted as evidence of an illiquidity or information asymmetry premium 
in the Brazilian market for blue chips and second tier stocks. It is interesting to note that this 
relationship is not observed for third tier stocks. The third tier stocks account roughly for 70% of 
the stocks listed in the BOVESPA, but for only 5% of the market turnover. 
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Table 1 - Ticks of Telemar PFD at BOVESPA (Bloomberg) 
N  Time  Bid/Trd/Ask  Size 
(x1000) 
Broker  Type  BEST BID  BEST ASK 
1  17:58:50  /39.5  x10  82  A     
2  18:02:46  39.27/39.45  400x200    B/A  39.27  39.45 
3  18:22:29  39.2/39.45  5000x20
0 
  B/A  39.2  39.45 
4  18:32:55  39.25/  1400x  39  B  39.2  39.45 
5  18:32:55  39.25/39.45  1400x20
0 
  B/A  39.25  39.45 
6  18:37:14  39.2/39.45  5000x20
0 
  B/A  39.2  39.45 
7  18:40:51  39.45  200    T  39.2  39.45 
8  18:40:51  /39.6  x800  4  A  39.2  39.45 
9  18:40:51  39.6  1200    T  39.2  39.45 
10  18:40:51  39.2/39.6  5000x80
0 
  B/A  39.2  39.6 
11  18:41:29  /39.8  x2000  81  A  39.2  39.6 
12  18:45:39  /39.55  x100  47  A  39.2  39.6 
13  18:45:39  39.2/39.55  5000x10
0 
  B/A  39.2  39.55 
14  18:47:07  39.05/  300x  114  B  39.2  39.55 
15  18:56:27  39.21/  200x  33  B  39.2  39.55 
16  18:56:27  39.21/39.55  200x100    B/A  39.21  39.55 
17  18:56:51  /39.59  x900  82  A  39.21  39.55 
18  18:59:43  39.21/  100x  33  B  39.21  39.55 
19  18:59:43  39.21  100    T  39.21  39.55 






Figure 1 – Frequency distribution of correlation coefficients between daily bid-ask spreads and the 


































Table 2 – Correlations: pooled monthly data for turnover, volume, and number of trades, January 




TRADES  VOLUME 
TURNOV
ER 
  0.831071  0.425892 
TRADES  0.831071    0.635016 






Table 3 – Association between bid-ask spreads and traditional liquidity measures. 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Ln(Volume traded)  -0.026903 -75.38 
Ln(Turnover)  -0.012677 -37.78 





Table 4 – Bid-ask spreads as explained by turnover and the residuals from regressions between 
turnover and other highly correlated liquidity measures. 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Constant  0.3127  73.0429 
ln(Ti,t)  -0.0425  -51.6061 
RES(Ti,t, Vi,t)  -0.0004  -0.3691 
RES(Ti,t, Ni,t)  0.0381  28.1437 





Table 5 – Monthly averages for ten portfolios ranked by bid-ask spread. 
Portfolio  Spread (%)  Return (%)  Volume traded  Number of 
Trades 
Turnover 
P1  1.31  1.36     168,535,962                    4,643    8,649,018,330 
P2  2.66  2.14       46,601,035                    1,505    2,824,933,451 
P3  4.23  2.47       15,127,517                       536       996,680,830 
P4  6.28  1.66         6,035,414                       205       438,351,242 
P5  8.80  1.05         2,446,886                         98       235,542,876 
P6  12.33  1.52         1,148,059                         55       144,572,380 
P7  18.25  1.54            505,914                         30       184,649,552 
P8  29.28  0.57            286,693                         25       252,013,434 
P9  51.37  1.89            464,932                         18       179,399,524 





Table 6 – Matrix of migration rates of stocks 
between portfolios ranked by bid-ask spread (%). 
 
Destination Portfolio, Pm 
Origin 
Portfolio, 
Pn  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1     72     20       3       1       1       1       0       0       1       1 
2     20     48     22       5       2       1       1       0       0       0 
3       3     22     38     22       8       4       2       1       0       0 
4       1       7     22     32     21     10       4       2       1       0 
5       1       2       9     21     30     19     10       4       2       1 
6       0       1       3     12     21     29     19       9       3       2 
7       1       1       2       4     12     20     30     19       8       3 
8       1       0       1       2       4     10     21     36     19       6 
9       0       0       0       1       2       4       9     22     44     18 





Table 7 – Proportions of companies involved in ADR programs in each portfolio. 
 
Portfolio 
Average proportions of 
companies involved in ADR 
programs 
t-statistic for the difference 
between the means for Pi 
and Pi-1. 
P1  60.85%   
P2  47.95%  9.1700 
P3  35.61%  9.9904 
P4  23.43%  10.1949 
P5  16.06%  6.1973 
P6  11.04%  5.7892 
P7  7.99%  4.0430 
P8  6.79%  1.5180 
P9  3.94%  4.9670 





Table 8 – The association between return and bid-ask spread 
  OLS    SUR   
  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
a (constant)  0.0075  *3.0409  0.0045  1.2030 
b2 (coefficient for the 
spread in blue chip and 
second tier stocks) 
0.1377  **1.8533  0.2240  *3.1362 
b3  (coefficient for the 
spread in third tier stocks) 
-0.0209  -1.6207  0.0041  0.3906 
R-squared  0.1900    0.5042   
Adjusted R-squared  0.1780    0.4957   
Durbin-Watson statistic  2.1764    2.0994   
F-statistic  1,574.90       
Log-likelihood      1,253.87   
  *    significant at a 5% level 
  **   significant at a 10% level 
 